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Reexamining drug regulation from the perspective of innovation
policy: comment
Abstract
This is a very colorful paper that makes for interesting reading. The author shows that the U. S. Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) increasingly does not decide about market access to drugs only, but
influences the innovation process as a whole. And although "information" does not appear in the title of
the paper, the distribution of knowledge as affected by the FDA plays an important role at several stages
of this process. For this reason, the body of this commentary is arranged according to the stages of the
innovation process.
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Reexamining Drug Regulation from the Perspective of
Innovation Policy
Comment
by
PETER ZWEIFEL
1 General Remark
This is a very colorful paper that makes for interesting reading. The author shows
that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) increasingly does not de-
cide about market access to drugs only, but inﬂuences the innovation process as
a whole. And although “information” does not appear in the title of the paper,
the distribution of knowledge as affected by the FDA plays an important role at
several stages of this process. For this reason, the body of this commentary is
arranged according to the stages of the innovation process.
2 Issues Addressed with Respect to the Innovation Process
2.1 FDA and the Supply of Biomedical Information for Drug Development
Research divisions in large pharmaceutical companies pose particular incentive
problems because employees hardly bear any of the considerable risks. Therefore,
companies have tended to outsource this function. The ﬁrst stage of the innovation
process thus frequently amounts to the purchase of biomedical information for drug
development. Here, the paper makes a nice point: Patent protection also applies to
this biomedical information, thus raising the cost of drug development to pharma-
ceutical companies rather than just increasing future returns on the ﬁnished product.
At this juncture, the reader would be interested to know whether and how the FDA is
involved in the regulation of the marketing of these information products as well, or
whether this remains exclusively within the authority of the Patent and Trademark
Ofﬁce (PTO).
2.2 FDA and Patent Protection of the Innovative Drug
Patent protection has several dimensions, and the FDA has come to modify several
of them.
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2.2.1 Geographical Dimension of Patent Protection
Here, one has to distinguish between the national and the international exhaustion of
patent rights. The U.S. imposes national exhaustion, which means that a protected
product can be resold at the reseller’s terms and conditions only within the U.S. The
EU Commission, by way of contrast, imposes international exhaustion because of
its quest for the realization of a single market. One might note that the underlying
issue is whether the property right conferred upon the inventor is simply to set one
monopoly price or to devise a schedule of differentiated prices. Price discrimina-
tion by pharmaceutical innovators according to willingness to pay in EU member
countries may well be efﬁciency-enhancing to the extent that it mimics Ramsey
pricing, which guarantees the recovery of the ﬁxed cost of drug development while
minimizing the distortion caused by deviating from the “price equals marginal cost”
rule (DANZON [1997]).
The Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987 prohibits re-importation of drugs
to the U.S. except by the manufacturer, who therefore is enabled to practice inter-
national price discrimination. The FDA is not directly involved in the geographical
dimension of patent protection. Still, by admitting a new drug to the U.S. market, it
does emit a signal that is very valuable to an innovator that intends to sell its product
worldwide.
2.2.2 Temporal Dimension of Patent Protection
It is in this dimension that the FDA has become an important player. In 1983, it was
directed, pursuant the Orphan Drug Act, to grant seven years of market exclusivity
for products for the treatment of rare diseases. As noted by Rebecca Eisenberg, this
has the same effect as patent protection. In 1984, the Hatch–Waxman Act involved
the FDA in the actual distribution of knowledge, in that on the one hand FDAwas to
accept Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDAs) ﬁled by generic producers,
and on the other hand it was to stay an ANDA approval for 30 months if the patent
owner ﬁled an infringement action. The Act also provides three years of market
exclusivity to an already approved product if it is changed in ways that require
new clinical trials. Because the Act at the same time required the PTO to increase
patent protection by a maximum of ﬁve years in order to make up for the delays
in FDA approvals, its combined effect may well be to extend the effective life of
pharmaceutical patents in spite of the ANDA option. Finally, the Food and Drug
Administration Modernization Act of 1997 directs the FDA to grant an additional
six months of exclusivity if a drug has to undergo pediatric trials.
It may be worthwhile to consult economic theory to see whether these modi-
ﬁcations might have anything to do with efﬁciency considerations. A simple yet
informative model by DE BROCK [1985] depicts effective patent life as the outcome
of a non-cooperative game played by the patent authority (complemented by the
FDA in the present case) and the innovator. The patent authority seeks to maximize
the sum of private beneﬁts (proﬁts accruing to the innovator) and social beneﬁts
(surplus available to the consumers of the new drug). DE BROCK [1985] shows that
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given credible assumptions, the authority tends to keep the effective patent life as
short as possible. However, it is constrained by the innovator’s reaction function,
which implies that it takes some minimal effective patent life for any innovative
effort to occur, and an extension to call forth additional innovative effort. The
authority’s optimum is where its indifference curves in {innovative effort, patent
protection} – space runs tangent to the innovator’s reaction function in the same
space; this optimum may be considered efﬁcient to the extent that the authority’s
utility function correctly mirrors society’s concerns.
This model is extended in ZWEIFEL AND BREYER [1997] to predict adjustments to
exogenous shocks. Three such changes are displayed in Table 1. The ﬁrst is increased
marginal cost of innovative effort – e.g., because of higher administrative hurdles
[item (a)] – a credible development because the FDA’s documentation requirements
have increased over time. The predicted optimal adjustment is to increase patent
life. The patent restoration provision of the Hatch–Waxman Act can be interpreted
in this light. Its provision to grant another three years of protection for conducting
additional clinical trials simply to modify a previously approved product may still
be an adjustment in the interest of efﬁciency, although a more differentiated clause
would have seemed more appropriate. However, it is questionable whether the
FDA Modernization Act, singling out drugs with pediatric trials, can be viewed as
efﬁciency-enhancing.
Table 1
Efﬁciency-Enhancing Adjustments of Effective Patent Life
Exogenous change Likely change of equilibrium
(a) Higher marginal cost effort of inno-
vation, due, e.g., to administrative
hurdles
Increase patent life
(Hatch–Waxman Act: patent restoration,
3 years for new clinical trials; FDA
Modernization Act?)
(b) Lower marginal revenue of innovation
effort, due, e.g., to more parallel im-
ports under international exhaustion
of patent rights
Increase patent life
(Prescription Drugs Marketing Act;
Orphan Drug Act?)
(c) Increased relative weight of marginal
social beneﬁts in authority’s utility
function
Decrease patent life
(Hatch–Waxman Act: ANDAs)
The second change is a drop in marginal revenues associated with innovative effort,
which is unrelated to its productivity in terms of discoveries [item (b) in Table 1].
An increase in parallel imports is a case in point. The predicted optimal adjustment
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again is an extension of patent life. The Prescription Drug Marketing Act ﬁts this
prediction, although (dating from 1987) it is more of a reaction to parallel imports
from Canada than to the EU’s quest for a single European market and its preference
for international exhaustion of patents, which only started at that time. Whether the
Orphan Drug Act also falls in this category is less clear, because drugs designed for
the treatment of rare diseases have always tended to feature low marginal returns to
innovative effort.
The third exogenous change may be an increased weight of social beneﬁts com-
pared to the innovator’s private beneﬁts in the patent authority’s (or ultimately the
legislators’) utility function [item (c) in Table 1]. Rebecca Eisenberg’s account em-
phasizes the desire to gain access to cheaper generic drugs earlier, possibly in the
interest of consumers, but even more likely in the interest of legislators who vie for
budgetary relief of the two public health insurance schemesMedicare andMedicaid.
This seems to be the rationale for the ANDA provision of the Hatch–Waxman Act,
which results in a shortening of effective patent life.
2.2.3 Institutional Dimension of Patent Protection
The author sees some merit in having both the TPO and the FDA involved in the
determination of effective patent life. Her position can be examined with reference
to Table 1, whose entries are to be understood as also saying that the more marked
any of the three changes (a) to (c) is, the more marked the adjustments should be
to be efﬁciency-enhancing. Now it may well be true that the FDA is better capable
than the PTO of estimating the magnitude of these changes. It should thus also be
better capable of effecting adjustments of the appropriate magnitude.
However, the relevant decisions were made in the legislature. In all instances
cited in the paper, legislation created a rather rigid mandate for the FDA, leaving
little room for bringing to bear FDA’s superior knowledge. Therefore, the question
of why there should be another authority for the ﬁne tuning of effective patent life
in the case of pharmaceuticals remains a somewhat open issue. One can of course
still argue that administrative expedience calls for such ﬁne tuning by the FDA, but
then this advantage would have to be weighed against the risk of capture, which
presumably is higher for a regulatory authority specialized in one single industry.
2.3 FDA and Post-Marketing Surveillance
The ﬁnal stage of the innovation process of possible relevance to the FDA is post-
marketing surveillance. Since the FDA’s primary responsibility continues to be to
determine the health and safety effects of a new drug, one would expect it to be
active in the monitoring of these effects after market launch. FDA could not only use
the same criteria for granting and revoking market access, but could also collect the
same type of information, for the evaluation of which it has comprehensive know-
how. Indeed, pursuant to the FDA Modernization Act of 1997, FDA has introduced
“fast track” procedures in combination with post-marketing studies. However, the
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author notes that companies’ compliance with post-marketing requirements has
been poor. It would be interesting to know whether the FDA lacks the authority to
revoke marketing approval or refrains from using this sanction in actual practice.
The paper describes how the National Institutes of Health stepped in with a large-
scale study of the effects of hormone replacement therapy in women. The question
remainswhy such a studywas not carried out or at least commissioned by the FDA. Is
evaluating the evidence from clinical trials so different from evaluating the evidence
from post-marketing studies? Or would the FDA as the regulator be challenged
for picking out one product rather than another for monitoring, its capacity being
insufﬁcient to cover all products approved?
These considerations highlight the fact the comprehensive monitoring of the
health effects of drugs is very costly. Rather than dwelling on the division of labor
between the FDA and the National Institute of Health, both of which are public
entities, one might therefore consider a larger degree of involvement of private
actors, viz. the patients themselves. At least as far as negative side effects are con-
cerned, patients would select those instances they deem important enough to justify
instigating a liability suit. In order to limit their ﬁnancial risk, the burden of proof
could be shifted to the defendant. In Japan, this shift was in fact undertaken with
regard to environmental impairment during the 1970s and to adverse drug reactions
during the 1980s (AWAJI [1989]). Of course, such a shift would cause a slowdown
in the process of pharmaceutical innovation; on the other hand, it would serve to
internalize the external costs of this process in a rather targeted way.
3 Final Evaluation
This paper gives a vivid account of how an institution (the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration in this case) whose original mission was to gather information for assessing
the health and safety characteristics of an innovation is mandated to allocate this
information between the innovator and the imitator. This has resulted in effective
patent protection of new drugs being decided upon by two authorities, viz. the Patent
and Trademark Ofﬁce and the FDA. The paper justiﬁably raises doubts concerning
the efﬁciency properties of some of the legislation that tends to extend patent protec-
tion. It is less sceptical about FDA’s concomitant dual mission. Yet, the FDA seems
to have little ﬂexibility to accommodate the (possibly changing) trade-off between
its traditional patient protection objective and its new drug innovation objective.
Dual missions of this type constitute an important issue of institutional design that
would merit further research.
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